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Abstract: The paper looks at how Japan, one of the major donors of African countries, 
has been redeﬁ ning its positions on the African continent in terms of bilateral aid and 
business opportunities, triangular collaboration and multilateral development projects 
in an increasingly ‘interpolar’ world of international relations. The discussion includes 
China’s expanding presence all over Africa as an important ‘reference point’ for the 
Japanese public at large and how that may inﬂ uence Japanese pragmatic foreign policy 
towards the continent and Japan’s involvement in African development. What are Japan’s 
priorities in the wake of hosting the ﬁ fth Tokyo International Conference on African 
Development (TICAD V) early in June 2013 in Yokohama? How does Japan go along 
with its conﬁ dent manner of inclusive development and ownership in African societies 
when at the same time it is challenged by China and other emerging actors? What are 
the items on Japan’s agenda for a re-intensiﬁ ed Africa policy?
Keywords: Japan–Africa relations, Tokyo International Conference on African Development, 
foreign aid policy, Paciﬁ c World Order, triangular cooperation
Introduction
Japan has for many decades been a stable and appreciated partner for a 
number of African countries. In the past twenty years, its relationship with 
the African continent “has been highly variable” yet at the same time “shaped 
by changing foreign policy objectives and internal political conditions” 
(Cornelissen 2012, p.461). Not only has Japan long been rhetorically 
engaged with African development; it has also been involved in the form 
of micro projects and large-scale developments on the ground. The central 
argument presented in this article states that with the fi fth Tokyo International 
Conference on African Development (TICAD) held between 1 and 3 June 
2013 in Yokohama, Japan has redefi ned its presence across Africa, and 
while it re-intensifi es its involvement, its primary objective is to re-position 
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itself both in an Afro–Asian context and in the global politico-economic 
arena; while secondly, this creates substantial policy implications for rival 
powers, in particular China. 
It is not the intention of the study to provide yet another overview of 
Japan’s involvement with Africa since the launch of TICAD in 1993—many 
scholarly papers1 have been written about that to date—but to investigate Japan’s 
redesigned African development strategy in a new “interpolar”2 environment, 
in particular in connection with China’s rapid and extended engagement with 
the continent, as well as the new Pacific context with the USA playing a key 
role in Asia, both as traditional partner of Japan, and redefined partner for 
China. The article aims at contributing to recent efforts by academic circles 
to “bring Japan firmly back into the debate about the unfolding synergies 
between Africa and the Asian drivers” (Ampiah and Rose 2012, p.153), which 
is in fact obvious in the light of the latest edition of TICAD with all its results 
and implications. The article seeks first to provide a brief summary of the 
TICAD process, but from the point of view of how it grew over the years, as 
well as how it has changed in its development philosophy. Secondly, TICAD 
V will be analysed from the ‘new discourse’ angle, including the major 
thematic considerations of the summit that will certainly have an effect on 
thinking about African development in the coming years. Third, some major 
policy comparisons will be drawn between China’s and Japan’s involvement 
in sub-Saharan Africa, especially in that Japan’s approach in official terms 
is a ‘regional initiative for Africa’, in co-operation with many international 
organisations such as the World Bank or the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), and since TICAD V, with the African Union Commission. 
With TICAD V, Japan again lays emphasis on ‘inclusive development’ and 
the ‘ownership’ principle on behalf of the African partners, and puts Japanese 
business interests high on the agenda. How successful this can be in the long 
run both in the African context and in a broader Afro–Asian framework will 
also be elaborated on. Finally, concluding remarks will summarise why Japan 
wants to remain an important actor in the system of international relations 
of the African continent and its national, regional and pan-African entities, 
and how it plans to utilise the TICAD process for implementing its foreign 
policy goals. 
Japan in an interpolar context: adaptation and innovation
The period following the “unipolar moment” in international affairs, as Charles 
Krauthammer proclaimed it in 19903, has seen a number of challenges—the 
hardest to cope with being the events of 9/11—and while one might think 
that the moment is over, we may have been witnessing the “emergence of a 
more multipolar world” (Smith 2012, p.52)  with the United States of America 
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as undoubtedly still “by far the most powerful state on the face of the earth” 
(Mearsheimer 2006, p.113), and with an increasing number of emerging powers 
practicing a growing influence in the global arena. Today’s international context 
is best described as ‘interpolar’ with the moment when “major global and 
regional powers cooperate to manage deepening interdependence, and build 
a viable and effective multilateral order” (Grevi 2009, p.7). As an “adaptive 
state”, Japan has been able to adjust herself to international change, and her 
“long-term goal is not [purely] the enhancement of Japanese power but the 
creation of an international system that will be protective of Japanese interests” 
(Berger, Mochizuki and Tsuchiyama 2007, p.279). Several scholars4 see that 
“more than any other country, Japan faces a number of challenges in relation 
to the changing global order, the rise of regional rivals, particularly China, and 
the reorganization of the architecture of global governance” (Dobson 2012, 
p.231). As Japan wants to maintain the status quo, demonstrating that it (still) 
is a contemporary great power, as one of the founding members of G6 (in 
1975) it advocates G85 as the core institution of internationalism, coming up 
with innovations to reach out toward the developing world. Japan intends to 
keep its agenda-setting power in international fora—we will see this in the 
case of the Tokyo International Conference on African Development—and 
all its “attempts at innovation and institution building6 in global governance 
[…] have actually been aimed at reinforcing the status quo” (Dobson 2012, 
p.250). In addition, as within her own vicinity China has grown into an 
influential regional power, overtaking Japan as the second largest economy in 
the world after the US, a more realpolitik-oriented approach seems inevitable 
for Japan in order to keep the balance of power in the region, “balancing 
Chinese influence in Southeast Asia” (Johnstone 1999, p.367). This rise may 
add to a re-born Japanese frustration, which was a symptom of Japanese 
Asia policy in the post-Cold War era. Her frustration is not particularly about 
China, but rather about how her top ally, the United States, has been managing 
international relations in the region and beyond. At the end of the 1980s it 
was more connected to the dominance of American power; today it may be 
attached to how the US has been formulating a new and extremely dominant 
framework of bilateral relations with China, thereby making determined steps 
to “frame a new ‘Pacific’ order” (Mendis 2013, p.24), seemingly along the 
dominant line of redefined Sino–American co-operation. In the meantime, 
Japan has been amassing more frustration, something, which “must not be 
underestimated”.7 It is not in the scope of this paper to look at how much 
and in what measurable ways Japan (and Japanese foreign policy) shows 
symptoms of frustration; its potential presence, however, needs to be noticed 
for further analyses.
Another evident feature of Japanese foreign policy is its innovative 
strength, and how—apart from adaptation to international values and the 
norms of global governance—it has been used in serving both Japanese 
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national interests and contributing to world peace and global development. 
The purpose of, for instance, launching TICAD, “the African Development 
Conference [was] not merely to hold such a conference. It is also a method 
for realizing Japan’s larger long-term national interests,”8 and while doing that 
setting the example for other such events. Not surprisingly, some years after 
TICAD was launched in 1993, other nations, including China, India, South 
Korea, Turkey, and even Singapore and Iran held similar events—of course, 
with different scopes and scale, but with the aim of fostering closer ties 
and cooperation between their respective countries and African states. Other 
such innovations can be seen in terms of establishing the entire international 
institutional framework in Southeast Asia with ASEAN (Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations) and the desired East Asian community, which, 
Japan believes, “can be built in the future on the basis of yûai9, the spirit 
of fraternity” (Toshiro 2010). With all these, as Berger suggests, Japan 
represents a pragmatic liberalist approach to the international system, which 
is motivated by an essentially liberal philosophy of international relations, 
one that stresses the building of international institutions and the deepening of 
economic and social ties between nations, including potential adversaries, as 
ways of creating an international system that is inherently more cooperative 
and peaceful than it has been in the past (Berger, Mochizuki and Tsuchiyama 
2007, pp.260-261). 
In particular, in times of uncertainties ranging from an increasing number of 
natural disasters (partially due to climate change) to financial vulnerabilities, 
political and economic crises, as well as changing power relations, a well-
maintained innovative capacity is the way forward. Key to fostering the 
balance in the system is how the state can adjust itself to the changing 
environment and, in the case of Japan, how it can rejuvenate herself so that 
the rest of the world maintains or re-develops an interest in cooperating 
with her. Regarding relations with Africa, Japan again demonstrated how 
innovative she could be when African growth and development are at 
stake. The fifth TICAD addressed a number of issues closely connected 
both with the future of the continent and the coming decades of Africa’s 
changing context of international relations, which Japan will certainly intend 
to influence. The next sections will analyze the TICAD process and the 
latest summit in detail.
TICAD and African development in Japanese foreign policy
To demonstrate how responsible Japan thought it was in the international 
system, its government proposed the launch of TICAD at the United Nations 
General Assembly in 1991. “It was a part of Japan’s diplomatic attempts to 
play a more active role in international affairs of the post-Cold War era as an 
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economic power” (Ochiai 2001, p.37). Several academic pieces10 thoroughly 
deal with the role of such conferences, which is therefore not the aim of 
the present paper. Our approach is to look at how TICAD has contributed 
to supporting Japan’s agenda-setting power about African development, and 
thence to the country’s leading interregional influence in the global arena, 
which had been planned to “elevate Japan’s overall foreign policy profile” 
(Seabra 2012, p.9). The end of the Cold War, according to Japanese scholar 
Kitagawa, “took away Africa’s strategic importance and the nations of the 
West abandoned policies of intervening in the internal affairs of African 
nations’, which were left with a series of hurdles such as, for instance, how 
‘to deal with the failure of the structural adjustment programmes and the 
political changes that occurred as a result” (Kitagawa 2013, p.9). Japan 
behaved in a proactive way along pragmatic foreign policy lines and wanted 
to promote Afro–Asian cooperation. Although Japan has never seen itself as 
a country of the South, it has been an advocate of South–South dialogue and 
cooperation, and as of today it has initiated several triangular projects with 
Southern partner countries, mainly involving China, India and Korea in her 
African development projects. The original Global South idea and its net of 
South–South mutually beneficial collaborations can be traced back to the 
Bandung Conference of 1955 and the Non-aligned Movement (NAM),11 added 
to which “Tokyo’s South–South cooperation is founded on the paternalistic 
thinking and methodology whereby a developed nation of the North, in 
particular Japan, takes initiative under which mutual cooperation between 
the countries of Asia and Africa is promoted” (Morikawa 2005, p.491). 
Notwithstanding this critical stance, Japan did take part in the Bandung 
event as the sole economically-technologically more advanced industrial 
country, and the ‘spirit of the conference’ can provide useful ground for 
developing linkages with sub-Saharan Africa. “Japanese initiatives through 
TICAD can probably be seen as an extension of the commitments made at 
the Bandung Conference” (Kitagawa 2013, p.16), which might still have 
been useful for Japanese diplomacy even if Japan had not participated 
in NAM-events after Bandung, and the country was not member of this 
growingly large group of states (not even an observer, as for instance, China). 
Apart from warnings from some scholars that “we should be careful not to 
overstate Japan’s activism at the Bandung conference” (Adem 2010, p.890), 
Japan was again present at the 50th anniversary of the 1955 event, held in 
April in Indonesia, which underlined how seriously Japan takes the “need 
for Africa–Asia cooperation” (Ibid p.891). In the context of South–South 
interregional economic relations, Japan (together with the Asia-Pacific region) 
aspires to a “proper role in global economic governance more broadly” 
fostering among other matters the “existing (though incomplete) East Asia 
Summit (EAS) framework” (Trasher and Najam 2012, p.5).
The first TICAD, which focussed on the “Asian experience and African 
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development”, was held in October 1993. It obviously had two major intentions: 
first, to revitalise and add new dynamism to the international community’s 
approach toward African development, and secondly, to act as a “vehicle to 
properly conceptualise and project Japan’s interests in Africa” (Ampiah and 
Rose 2012, p.154). Such a proactive and dynamic attitude at the end of the 
Cold War on behalf of the leading industrial power of East Asia wishing to 
position itself as a ‘global middle power’ was understandable first and foremost 
in the region where Japan had plans to spread her influence.12 In a period 
when the international community was best characterized by ‘aid fatigue’, 
Japan came up with TICAD as a tool to advertise its will as a top donor 
ready to take the responsibility of tackling Africa’s predicament, which she 
considered a global challenge.13 As a unique initiative in Japanese diplomatic 
history, TICAD could add to Japan’s respected position in the international 
donor community, but until 2013 it was not considered domestically to have 
been successful, bringing tangible results for the Japanese economy. The 
business community did not really develop an interest in the process, and it 
took five summits to draw the attention of the Japanese people to African 
affairs. The nature of TICAD has changed: in the course of preparing for the 
fifth summit it has been presented as much more inward-looking, stressing 
the importance of the business sector, private companies and the concept of 
public-private partnerships (PPP) in light of Japan’s national interest. The 
event itself has grown in numbers: while the first summit hosted 48 African 
nations, 31 donor and partner countries and 41 international or regional non-
governmental organisations and observers, at TICAD V 51 African nations, 30 
donor and partner countries and 77 other organisations represented themselves 
at high levels. The number of participating country leaders—mainly heads of 
state—has shown a steady increase from 15 in 1993 to over 40 in 2013. The 
intention of the Japanese government to make and keep TICAD massively 
attended not only by essentially all the African states, but also by Asian 
countries, together with other donors (European countries and the US) and 
a growing number of non-governmental entities, is clearly seen from the 
data in Table 1. 
The main thematic scope has also been changing (see Table 2), and apart 
from the basic concept of African ownership and ‘owned’ development—which 
in the eyes of some scholars strengthened the hegemonic donor regime, paying 
‘only lip service’ to its core notion14—has helped Japan accentuate the need 
for a redesigned image of Africa (mostly by the Africans themselves), which 
encourages investments in all sectors from all around the world. TICAD V 
turned out to be the most business- and investment-oriented summit of the 
process. Let us now turn our attention to the event, its outcomes and their 
implications for the future of Afro–Asian relations and global politics, keeping 
an eye on the potential of a new Pacific power-distribution scenario along 
Chinese–American lines.
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TICAD V in Japan and an eye to a new Pacific World Order
Japan was making preparations for a fifth summit devoted to African 
development at a moment when the international system had undergone 
a number of important changes. In our era of deepening interdependence, 
with more regional powers demanding that their increasingly stronger voices 
be heard and taken into consideration about what directions global politics 
and governance should take, the different entities of the system can witness 
the rise of Africa (together with other regions formerly referred to as ‘third 
world’). As The Economist reported in its December 3 issue in 2011, “after 
decades of slow growth, Africa has a real chance to follow in the footsteps 
of Asia” (p.13). The Asian experiences of economic growth and development, 
therefore, have become a key issue for the African continent, which itself 
has been portrayed in a modified way: no longer the ‘hopeless’ but the 
‘rising continent’. The world can now recognize that “Africans are now 
masters of their fate and equal global partners. They are better prepared 
today than ever before to meet the challenges they face. In driving the 
change, they need partners” (Conze 2013, p.21). Within the framework 
of a relatively speedy competition, which signals a new period in Africa’s 
international relations where the continent’s major trading partners presently 
include China, India, South Korea, Brazil and Turkey, Japan wants to stay 
firm as one of the most influential partners of African development, not 
only as probably the biggest advocate and donor of human security-based 
development, but for instance in support of enhanced Japanese business-
oriented presence across the continent. As African economies continue to 
grow alongside a rapid increase in Chinese engagement coupled with that 
of other emerging countries, “many Japanese, particularly policymakers, 
strongly feel the necessity to deepen the relationship with Africa”.15 In 
addition, the Japanese private sector is pushing the government to provide 
support for their expanding involvement in Africa. TICAD, therefore, is not 
only a tool to keep the Japanese diplomatic lead high on the agenda, but 
to present it as “an opportunity for advertising the government’s efforts for 
internal pressure groups”,16 and thus to satisfy growing internal needs. Not 
surprisingly, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe (2013) wants his country “to fly 
higher hand in hand with a more dynamic Africa” at a moment when Africa 
demonstrates growth and increasing stability, thereby offering opportunities 
for investment in its various sectors.17 Africa is most interested in lasting 
investments—in particular, in terms of infrastructure development and job 
creation— so Japan’s promise from the past TICADs (in 2003 and 2008) 
to double official development assistance (ODA) is “not in Africa’s interest 
anymore” (Aoki 2013). Today’s set of aspirations is clear, both with regard to 
Africa’s wants and Japan’s national interests, and at the same time contains 
requirements in the changing global context.
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From a more global political perspective, with serious implications for Japan’s 
positions in her own region, the “birth of a Pacific World Order” (Mendis 2013, 
p.22) needs to be added to our investigation. The “Chimerican18 symbiosis” 
offers “an opportune moment for the two Pacific nations to initiate steps to 
frame a new ‘Pacific’ order through trade and commerce” (Ibid p.24). “Countries 
in the region that are growing more economically dependent on China will 
discover incentives to also tie their security to China” (Ikenberry 2008, p.107), 
so presenting another perspective, from which our view is affirmed that it is 
not astonishing at all that the US encourages a new ‘Pacific Century’ with 
enhanced Sino–US relations in its centre. What is Japan’s place in this imagined 
new scenario? Can we consider an already frustrated Japan reacting by getting 
her claws out? Both the US and China (or other states in the region) most 
probably underestimate the strength of Japanese frustration—not mentioning 
the capability of her Self Defence Forces (SDF), which, as far as the military 
equipment is concerned, are the most modern in Asia. Recently, Japan has 
decided to increase its military budget over a five-year term with five per cent.19 
“China is not rising in a vacuum. It is rising on a continent in which there are 
many, many competitors” (Zakaria 2011, p.14). In a pragmatic and strategic 
way China fosters a ‘peaceful rise’, and its “economic integration into East 
Asia has [already] contributed to the shaping of an East Asian community 
that may rise in peace as a whole. And it would not be in China’s interest to 
exclude the United States from the process” (Bijian 2005, p.24). From both 
sides of the Pacific Ocean there seems to be a mutually shared target: to 
jointly build a peaceful (in this respect pacific, too) framework of collaborative 
behaviour and relations. On the US side this has obvious expectations: not 
to see a rising China with allies from her direct vicinity (an important sphere 
of American influence at the same time) formulating an alternative set of 
values, which then might challenge US geostrategic aspirations. We can agree 
with Ikenberry in stating that there are clear implications for the US, as “the 
more deeply institutionalized the Western order is, the greater the likelihood 
that China will rise up inside this order” (Ikenberry 2008, p.114). The US, 
therefore, needs to work along a strategy which attempts to avoid the rise 
of an ‘alternative or even rival order’ driven by China, thus, to “continue to 
uphold its multilateral commitments, maintain and even expand its alliance 
partnerships […] to perpetuate the existing international order” (Ibid). Obviously, 
Japan does not want to be left out from this strategic setting. Even more so, 
Japan intends to build upon its historically close ties with the US to foster an 
Asia-Pacific setting with strong Japanese involvement. “Japan is central to 
[President] Obama’s effort to shift America’s focus toward the Pacific Rim 
after years of preoccupation with war and with counterterrorism efforts in the 
Middle East and North Africa”, at the same time encouraging “an Asia-Pacific 
trade agreement among democracies in the region struggling against China’s 
growing economic clout” (Calmes 2013).
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“China’s initiatives and development are always matters of top priority to 
the Japanese public; its expanding interests in Africa [had already] attracted 
much media coverage in the period leading to TICAD IV” (Hirano 2012, 
p.191). Comparisons of most of its moves with those of China can be traced 
in many publications, such as in the special issue of the Japan Times published 
on the first day of TICAD V citing African studies specialist Mitsugi Endo 
when he says that “China’s presence has increased (during the five years 
since 2008), and that of Japan has been unable to compete” (Aoki 2013). 
In light of her neighbouring competitor as well as the need to locate her 
national interest in Africa properly, together with keeping its distinctive role 
as Africa’s development partner, Japan was committed to make a twist in the 
TICAD process at its fifth quientennial forum.
TICAD V was held from 1 to 3 June 2013 in Yokohama, Japan, under the 
motto ‘Hand in Hand for a More Dynamic Africa’, and discussed six major 
elements of a new road map in the form of the Yokohama Action Plan 2013–
2017. These covered 1) private sector-led growth, 2) accelerated infrastructure 
development for the sake of 3) ‘sustainable and resilient growth’, continuous 
capacity development, 4) the empowerment of farmers, and therefore enhanced 
emphasis on agricultural development, 5) the creation of an inclusive society 
by ‘reducing poverty and fulfilling basic human needs’, so developing the 
education, health and water sectors, and 6) the consolidation of peace, stability, 
democracy and good governance as the overarching framework for long-term 
development.20 The Action Plan renewed Japan’s original ‘twin principles’ of 
African ‘ownership’ and international ‘partnership’. Since the launch of the 
TICAD process Japan has focussed its strategic approach on human security 
and ‘inclusive development’, and has been promoting the issue of ‘ownership’, 
which can be a significant step towards sustainable development as such on the 
continent.21 In addition to the long-term co-organizing partners of the Japanese 
government, such as the United Nations or the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), TICAD V offered the opportunity to deepen ‘African 
ownership’: as Helen Clark of UNDP said in her keynote address at a Japan 
International Cooperation Agency (JICA) symposium, “the inclusion of the 
African Union as a co-organizer is the latest reflection of the ownership by 
Africa of TICAD’s approach” (Clark 2012). As numerous forms of partnership, 
the Yokohama Declaration of 2013 underlines that the TICAD process has 
“effectively promoted and supported South–South and Triangular cooperation, 
including [also] intra-African cooperation”.22
Triangular cooperation has long been favoured by the Japanese government, 
as it can—as Japan sees it—offer adequate response not only to events, 
pressure and activities of third parties within Africa, but also outside 
the continent, and can help Japan develop her relations with Southeast 
Asian nations. One of the integrated development models that Japan’s aid 
agency, JICA always refers to as a successful triangular project is in Nacala, 
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Mozambique—a complex project in co-operation with Brazil called the 
‘Nacala Corridor Development Programme’. This project and the Mombasa 
corridor in Kenya, as JICA reports, even “have the potential to become 
regional Specific Economic Zones—often called ‘growth corridors’—developed 
around key natural resource investments and associated infrastructure” (Kato 
2013, p.8). Potential triangular thinking among China, Japan and African 
countries has been on the agenda in particular, as “building a peaceful Africa 
is in everyone’s interest” (Tarrósy 2012, p.60). For any such project, and 
from the overall perspective, ‘Africa’s own needs’ and Africa’s reinforced 
self-confidence are crucial. In response to these and the ‘evolving global 
context’ of ‘interpolarity’, “the TICAD process has become more action- 
and results-oriented” (MOFA 2013). Some of the strategic approaches of 
TICAD V can be observed by extracting the following phrases taken from 
the Yokohama Declaration: 
“supporting Africa’s own efforts’; ‘mainstreaming women’; ‘increasing 
opportunities for youth’; ‘develop the human potential, in a comprehensive 
manner, strengthening capacity in the areas of humanitarian concern, conflict 
prevention, peacekeeping, post conflict reconstruction and development, 
illicit trafficking and combating terrorism” (Ibid).
Many are convinced that female involvement is crucial for any long-term 
development on the continent. Lakshmi Puri, the Acting Head of UN Women 
(the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of 
Women) gave her firm opinion about this on the second day of TICAD V, 
saying that “women have been, and should be part of, realizing [the new 
growth] trajectory of the great power of possibilities”, underlying that the 
gender strategy of TICAD V with all its elements and initiative “would not 
only bring productivity and economic growth dividend but also social and 
environmental benefits” (Puri 2013).23 These are greatly needed for realizing a 
more developmentalist paradigm, which overarches Japan’s policies fostering 
“how society grants to individuals the capacity for taking part in creating their 
livelihoods, governing their own affairs, and participating in self-government” 
(Peet and Hartwick 2009, p.3).
Another high-profile topic approaches the question of development the 
viewpoint of industry, also reflecting upon security concerns. The Secretary-
General of the International Maritime Organization in his speech of 2 June 
2013 underlined that “maritime development and the promotion of maritime 
industry will be an initial explosive and triggering device for Africa’s own 
economic development” (Sekimizu 2013), but that fighting piracy, particularly 
off the coast of Somalia, was a common task both for Africans and Japanese 
and for the global international community, as shipping has a “vital role for 
world trade” and “maritime transport a vital facilitator of African trade”, 
without which “African development would not be possible” (Ibid). The 
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building and modernization of African ports and maritime-related infrastructures, 
together with the transference of knowledge and technology, immediately and 
easily call for triangular co-operation, in particular when national interests 
are at stake. The Japanese government, therefore, has been paying attention 
to Djibouti’s geostrategic significance, its role in regional stability and ‘as 
a main base for Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force’ mainly in ‘mounting 
anti-piracy operations’.24 
Japan vs. China in Africa? Can China fit into Japan’s triangle?
Triangular thinking is even more understandable in the context of Japan’s 
regional scope in different parts of the African continent. Over recent years 
Japan has been focussing on East Africa, where it has been involved in 
building ‘soft infrastructure’, for instance, in the form of border contact 
points. Japan “always looks at the projects it finances in a regional context, 
rather than only in a national framework”.25 Gradually, there has been a shift 
towards the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and after 
establishing a position at the East African Community (EAC) Headquarters in 
Arusha, Tanzania, Japan sent a full-time staff member to the SADC Secretariat, 
too. Hiroyasu Kobayashi, Ambassador of Japan to Botswana and Special 
Representative to SADC, is responsible for pushing Japan’s efforts to bolster 
trade and investment in the SADC region, which recently has become more 
interesting for Japan due to its measurable political stability. Botswana’s case 
clearly shows that due to this secure environment “Japanese companies have 
invested in mining, ICT, consulting, car service station and import services 
in Botswana and the country is seeking even more investment from Japan” 
(Tsimane 2013). Across Southeast Asia Japan has a number of agreements 
with the governments of Thailand, its International Development Co-operation 
Agency (TICA), that of Malaysia and Singapore, in collaboration with which 
it tries to channel 
“Asian energy (HR know-how) [into] how to absorb technologies into 
local contexts. Japan even uses some resources in Latin America, for 
example, in Brazil where Japanese immigrants’ descendants understand 
the Japanese way of doing business, technology, farming, etc. Currently, 
this is a very small number, but it is an important diaspora for Japan.”26 
Many other examples demonstrate Japan’s commitment in fostering the 
triangular–trilateral approach in Africa-related projects. The third partner, as seen 
earlier, can be another Asian country (advocating South–South co-operation), 
or multi-donor, international institutions. In a sometimes over-exaggerated 
discourse of Japanese–Chinese rivalry in Africa can anyone seriously think 
that China can also fit into any such triangular scenario, resulting in more 
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co-operation than competition? The last part of the closing section looks into 
some of the major trends.
Insofar as “Sino-Japanese relations are characterized by a complex mix of 
co-operation and competition” (Johnstone 1999, p.383), the present study also 
finds that rivalry over African ‘friendship’ and the mutual presence of the two 
Asian nations is overstated in most cases. Triangular co-operation advocated 
by Japan in the African development context is possible except where growing 
territorial tensions, for instance, over some disputed East China Sea islets27, 
and other related political problems, hinder it. “In the professional sphere”, 
however, says Professor Takahashi of Kobe University, the “Chinese have 
been trying to learn from Japanese experiences in development assistance 
both through organizational interface and academic exchanges”,28 and all 
these indicate one potential dimension of this kind in the long run. 
Part of the broader power-distribution context should be seen as rivalry, 
and both Japan’s and China’s (or other nations’) “respective stances on Africa 
can be viewed as an integral part of their broader foreign policy objectives” 
(Rose 2012, p.222). In Fareed Zakaria’s words, 
“At the politico-military level, we remain in a single-superpower world. 
But in all other dimensions—industrial, financial, educational, social, 
cultural—the distribution of power is shifting, moving away from American 
dominance. […] we are moving into a post-American world, one defined 
and directed from many places and by many people” (Zakaria 2012, p.8)
In such a transforming international setting, “Japan also hopes to highlight 
its global strategic position by exerting greater influence in Africa and other 
developing regions” (Lehman 2005, p.440), so it is not surprising that it 
has a preference for triangular projects, the successful tool of its TICAD 
process. But it needs to be more cautious in choosing the right means and 
forms of co-operation, and how these are then communicated in the media. 
Katsumi Hirano underlines that “Japanese philosophy on development […] 
affirms that loans are more effective to development through the promotion of 
self-help and ownership (and of national development) than grants” (Hirano 
2012, p.194). It is easier to imagine Japan’s co-operation with China in 
Africa in a “business-like way”, argues Motoki Takahashi.29 For example, 
in yen-loan projects, in which Chinese companies won their participation 
with competitive bids, co-operation was inevitable. However, when it came 
to “cutting the tape at a Kenyan road opening, the Chinese did not behave 
in a correct way, and locals believed that it was a Chinese project [only]; in 
fact, no one knew who was Chinese and who was Japanese.”30 More attention 
has, therefore, be turned over the past few years to proper communication 
during and particularly after the completion of projects, both with the locals 
and with the partnering third entities. In general, monitoring and follow-up 
activities about maintenance have become crucial criteria for any Japan-
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funded African development issue. In the last decade, since China launched 
its FOCAC in 2000, “discussions about possible areas of co-operation have 
begun to take place within the context of bilateral and trilateral (including 
South Korea) diplomatic efforts and epistemic communities”, and we can agree 
with Caroline Rose and other observers about the main underlying idea of 
mutual learning from each other (Rose 2012, pp.230-231). New and proactive 
engagements from both Japan and China benefitting Africans, and therefore 
some dynamic triangular collaboration with the inclusion of China may also 
result in China’s becoming a responsible donor, something also desired by 
the US. Not in an attempt to assimilate China, but to go along with adjusting 
the international system, gradually changing it and its institutions together 
with China, and thus to make China more responsible for its involvements 
and engagements globally. Being and taking part in a “shared commitment” 
(Brzezinski and Scowcroft 2012, p.32) can strengthen existing values, while 
at the same time present different approaches and methods, which finally can 
inspire all the actors of the international scene, and benefit the local levels. 
Conclusion
In terms of African development Japan is a ‘status quo’ power—and it 
wants to remain so. In general, “its attempts at innovation and institution 
building in global governance […] have actually been aimed at reinforcing 
the status quo” (Dobson 2012, p.250). Looking at Japan’s foreign policy 
architecture, TICAD is a unique initiative in historic terms. Yet, as seen by 
Japanese experts, 
“TICAD’s position is small in priorities in Japan’s diplomacy as a whole 
since Japan has not been so much committed in global developmental 
leadership and been more concerned about countries with more political and 
economic interests, such as the US, Asian neighbours, and Europeans.”31 
Scholars agree that “TICAD was becoming more like a kind of diplomatic 
‘festival’”,32 still an important pillar of Japan’s Africa policy, yet transformed 
as an opportunity of awareness-raising to “draw the attention of Japanese 
people to African affairs.”33 TICAD has always had an important dimension 
pertaining to civil society, which to many in Japan, is “a bright aspect”34 
not only of the entire process, but also of contemporary Japan. Some other 
researchers view this slightly differently, although they confirm that the civil 
society dimension has been gradually enlarged in accordance with pressure 
from them directed at the Japanese government.35
“Latent Japanese fears of American neglect and abandonment” (Johnstone 
1999, p.380) have been detected in Japanese diplomatic actions and reactions 
over recent years, in particular since the re-formulating Sino–American system 
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of relations, which received new impetus with the informal June 2013 summit 
of President Obama and President Xi in California. This definitely affects 
how Japan can plan its regional strategies and maintain its leading role in a 
number of domains.
“Japan’s motivation in organizing [the first TICADs] was three-fold. Japan 
clearly saw the humanitarian needs in Africa and, given Japan’s economic 
wealth, realized it could create a positive aid environment. Second, Japan 
desired to be treated as a major global power, […] Third, as part of its 
strategic plan to position itself as a major Asian power, Japan used TICAD 
as a platform to put forward the so-called Asian development model” 
(Lehman 2005, p.427). 
As of today, TICAD is more related to business than to aid, and the Japanese 
government tries to balance between remaining a donor and encouraging 
Japanese (private) companies to enter the African markets. In an interpolar 
environment, in which similar initiatives about Africa and African development 
than TICAD have grown, as Kweku Ampiah in a piece reflecting upon the 
executive summary of African diplomats in Tokyo pointed out, “if TICAD 
is to retain its relevance, […] the process must refocus on the twin concepts 
of ownership and partnership” (Ampiah 2008, p.324),36 and move toward an 
outcome more tangible than rhetorical. 
As with all other TICAD meetings, TICAD V was also a PR exercise 
both at home and for a wider international audience, which at the same 
time could shed more light on the real intentions and needs of Africans 
(Aicardi de Saint Paul 1999, p.121). With the fifth edition of the summits, 
and especially with the more detailed and action-oriented policy documents 
and roadmap, Japan has given herself a chance to remain a leading force 
behind African development, together with a newly exposed element to 
promote her own national business interests, which can further strengthen 
her commitments to a long-term development path for the continent. The 
most important task now seems to be to keep the momentum alive with a 
strong follow-up mechanism that includes even more African content as long 
as the African Union Commission is also on board. Japan’s development 
philosophy towards Africa has changed in the sense that it stresses more 
upon efforts to sustain growth while fostering local inclusiveness and the 
sense of owning local development, and lays emphasis on the involvement of 
businesses, thereby creating discernible synergies between Africa and Japan 
(since Japan’s development philosophy in East Asia always revolved around 
sustainable growth). These obviously entail some new challenges for anyone 
in competition with the country of the rising sun. 
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Table 1 From TICAD I to TICAD V: Basic facts and figures
No. Year African nations
Donors/partner/
other countries
Int’l/regional 
organisations, NGOs, 
observers
I 1993 48 31 41
II 1998 51 26 72
III 2003 50 38 100
IV 2008 51 35 77
V 2013 51 30 77
Sources of data: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan (MOFA),37 SAIIA Global Powers 
and Africa Programme,38 The Japan Times39
Table 2 Central topics and major policy outcomes at the TICADs
No. Topic Policy documents
I Asian experience and 
African development
Good governance
Tokyo Declaration on African 
Develop.
II Social and economic development
Human capital building
Tokyo Agenda for Action
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III Human security
African ownership
‘TICAD Tenth Anniversary 
Declaration’
IV Accelerating economic growth
Establishing human security
Environmental and climate 
change
Yokohama Declaration
Yokohama Agenda for Action
TICAD Follow-up Mechanism
V Boosting Economic Growth  
Accelerating Infrastructure  
and Capacity Development
Empowering Farmers
Promoting Sustainable and
Resilient Growth
Creating an Inclusive Society
Consolidating Peace, Stability,
Democracy and Good 
Governance
Yokohama Declaration 2013
Yokohama Action Plan 2013–17
Sources: MOFA, www.ticad.net
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